Is China preparing for an impending war with a new mobilization law? About a week before the law took effect on October 1, Defense Ministry Spokesperson Colonel Jiang Bin said the law should not be linked to developments in Taiwan or a possible conflict. The spokesperson rejected such a linkage. Noting that the change was aimed at keeping pace with the times, the spokesperson also said that China adheres to the “active defense” principle dating back to the Mao era, which stipulates not responding unless attacked.
Approved by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and signed by President Xi Jinping in August 2026, the law expands the powers to use and seize civilian and private assets during crises. The powers are expanded during this period. The sectors whose contribution to mobilization is made mandatory under “military-civilian integration” are as follows: – Cybersecurity – Artificial intelligence – Communications – Data processing – Information technology
The law expands the scope of mobilization. The most significant change is the expansion of the grounds for mobilization to also cover “national development interests”; observers believe this could be used in Taiwan and the South China Sea. The law is part of the “comprehensive securitization” process under Xi. According to US estimates, the likelihood of Beijing using force against Taiwan before 2028 has receded. Beijing established the Central National Security Commission in 2014.
Why it matters
The law’s real impact lies in its ability to place civilian technology sectors, spanning from cybersecurity to artificial intelligence, at the state’s disposal during times of crisis; this creates a new risk framework for companies operating in China and for global technology supply chains. The addition of national development interests to the grounds for mobilization means the mechanism can be activated not only in the face of a war threat but also on economic grounds, blurring the law’s practical limits. Despite Beijing’s rejection of the Taiwan connection, observers’ doubts show that the region’s tension line is expanding not only on military but also on legal ground. At the same time as the US sees the likelihood of the use of force before 2028 as having receded, Beijing’s expansion of its mobilization infrastructure leaves open the question of how analyses relate to preparations on the ground.